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vides the key for determining the likely size of the bias when estimating compensating wage differentials with real data. Substituting a range of values for the three factors that, in our opinion, conservatively characterize actual labor market data sets, we find that the size of the bias is large-large enough to cause estimates to underestimate true compensating differentials by a factor of 50 percent or more, and even to result in wrong-signed coefficients. Section IV generalizes this analysis by allowing the hedonic wage constraint to assume a quadratic functional form. While the properties of the bias cannot be analytically derived, Monte Carlo analysis yields identical results: In particular, the size of the bias is the same when the three factors identified above are held constant. Section V demonstrates that the wage equations estimated from our simulated data "look" very much like regressions commonly reported in labor market studies.
On the basis of these findings, we conclude that contemporary labor market studies may severely underestimate workers' marginal willingness to pay for job attributes. This has implications for a number of applications of compensating wage differentials, including value of life studies.
II. The Nature of the Bias Due to Unobserved Productivity
The problem that arises when estimating compensating wage differentials in the presence of unobserved productivity is easily illustrated in figure 1. Here we have drawn the true hedonic wage line (corresponding to a given stock of human capital) for the case in which jobs consist of two dimensions, the wage rate (w) and one (desirable) nonwage job attribute (n). In figure lb we have also included an expansion path, which identifies an average worker's optimal w-n combinations as his human capital varies. The expansion path slopes upward, indicating that as a worker's human capital increases, he will choose jobs that are characterized by larger values of both the wage and the nonwage job amenity.3 Consider first a population of workers with differing tastes, identical stocks of observed human capital, and no unobserved productivity differences across workers. This population of workers will sort themselves along the given hedonic wage line. Accordingly, the econometrician, observing the w-n choices of the workers, perhaps with some measurement error in the wage, is able to consistently estimate the 
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wage trade-off-or compensating wage differential-associated with a given increase of the job attribute variable. This case is illustrated in figure la.
If we introduce productivity differences across workers, the observed w-n combinations become more diffuse. More productive workers choose jobs further along their expansion paths than less productive workers. When these differences are very large, worker types having identical preferences will be located at far ends of their respective expansion paths. Sufficient productivity heterogeneity can cause sorting along the expansion path to dominate sorting along the hedonic wage lines. If these productivity differences are not controlled for in estimation, the w-n scatter will lead to an estimated hedonic wage line that converges toward the expansion path. This situation is illustrated in figure lb.
In both cases, the compensating wage differential that the econometrician wants to estimate is given by the slope of the true hedonic wage line, which is identical in both graphs. In the first case, the w-n scatter allows him to correctly identify this differential. In the second case, the presence of unobserved productivity heterogeneity induces a positive slope to the w-n scatter that causes the econometrician to incorrectly estimate the true hedonic wage line. The next two sections are concerned with determining the size of this bias.
III. A Model of the Labor Market in Which Job
Choices are Represented by a Linear Hedonic Wage Function Let jobs be characterized by their hourly rate of compensation, consisting of a wage component (w) and a single nonwage component (n). The nonwage component may be thought of as representing some desirable job attribute, such as safe working conditions, flexible hours, or fringe benefits.4 Competition in the product and labor markets causes compensation packages to be characterized by trade-offs between these two components. Jobs that have low values of the nonwage amenity compensate by offering high wages. Jobs that have higher values of the amenity offer lower wages. Let p,, denote the hedonic wage, or compensating wage differential, associated with the nonwage job attribute. It represents the forgone wages associated with an additional unit of n. Finally, we assume that more productive workers are able to choose 4The case of an undesirable job attribute is discussed below. The extension to the multiattribute case is straightforward, provided that the respective taste parameters are distributed mutually independently.
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JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY among jobs that are characterized by larger rates of hourly total compensation; the ith worker's labor market productivity is denoted by K2. These ideas are represented in the following linear hedonic wage function: w = Kz -pnn.
(1) Equation (1) identifies the set of jobs, characterized by their wage and nonwage components, that are available to a worker with labor market productivity KZ. In our analysis, we shall think of K as including the kinds of human capital variables usually included in empirical labor market studiesvariables such as education, age, and labor market experience-as well as other variables that are difficult if not impossible for the econometrician to observe and measure-such as intelligence, perseverance, and the ability to work well with others. We assume that both the worker and prospective employers in the labor market are able to distinguish the worker's true labor market productivity. The econometrician, on the other hand, is assumed to measure only a portion of the worker's total productivity. This difference between total and observed productivity is critical for empirical estimates of Pn.
In addition to choosing a job, each worker must determine his optimal level of product market consumption (X) and leisure (L). Let the ith worker's preferences be represented by Uz(X, L, n) = ax lnX + alnL + a'l n(T-L)n,
where T -L represents hours of work.5 The worker is assumed to maximize utility subject to (1) and the usual financial budget constraint relating product market expenditures to labor market earnings, pxX = (T -L)w.
Given this framework, the resulting demand equations for the wage and nonwage job attributes are given by 
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where r = ax/a, and the i superscript is suppressed, here and subsequently, for notational convenience.
Consider now a population of workers of differing tastes and productivities, each choosing his optimal job as described above. Suppose that an econometrician was able to exactly measure individual workers' job choices. Suppose further that he was interested in estimating the hedonic wage function given by (1) and, in particular, the value of the compensating wage differential, p,. We now derive the bias that will result when important labor market productivity variables are omitted from the empirical analysis.
Let each worker's total labor market productivity be given by the sum of two variables, Ko and Ku, representing the worker's observed and unobserved (to the econometrician) labor market productivity. Let the regression equation be W = t+ + otKo + 3n +-E, 
If we assume that the ratio of taste parameters, r = ax/a,, and market productivity parameters, Ko and Ku, are distributed mutually independently across the population of workers, then this bias term can be conveniently expressed in terms of three factors. This result will allow us to make some inferences concerning the size of the bias in actual labor market data. Since 13 is negative, the estimate , will be positively biased.8 It is straightforward to demonstrate that the size of this bias is increasing in y and decreasing in r. In terms of figure 1, the greater the extent of unobserved productivity heterogeneity (represented by increasing y), the more severe the sorting will be along the respective expansion paths, and the greater the associated bias. Further, the greater the dispersion along the respective hedonic wage lines due to differing tastes (represented by increasing v), the smaller the biasing effect of a given degree of unobserved productivity heterogeneity. The effect of the third factor, w, the average wage share, is ambiguous.9
It will prove convenient to express equation (7) in terms of the ratio of estimated to true 1 values. Since plim 13 = 13 + bias, rearrangement of (7) yields 
Equation (8) is especially valuable for our purposes because it allows
one to calculate what the expected estimated value of 13 would be, given a data set characterized by particular values of W, T, and My and a given true value of 13. In particular, it would be interesting to estimate the degree of bias that would likely result when using the kinds of large, national, cross-sectional data sets that are commonly eman identical distribution across workers. That is, each of the nonwage job attribute coefficients will be biased to the same degree as in the single nonwage job attribute case, provided that w, r, and -y are the same.
8 Suppose that the nonwage job attribute is a disamenity, defined by an < 0, and that the hedonic wage equation is given by w = K' + pun, where P, now represents the increase in wages for each unit of n the worker must consume on the job. Let W = E[wlK] as before, but now w > 1 (the wage share of total compensation is greater than one because total compensation now includes the disutility from consuming the undesirable job attribute). Then eq. (7) remains the same except that 1 -W is replaced by w -1. Note that w -1 in the amenity case equals 1 -w in the disamenity case, since both expressions equal pun/K. Also, since PB is positive in the disamenity case, the estimate , will now be negatively biased. 9 Note, however, that in the range of parameter values used in the analysis below, decreases in w are unambiguously associated with an increase in the bias. ployed in empirical studies of compensating wage differentials. This is the subject of the remainder of this section.
The first step in this line of inquiry requires settling on some reasonable values for the three determinants of the bias, w, r, and -y. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, fringe benefits accounted for some 27.6 percent of total compensation in 1980 (U.S. Department of Labor 1980).1o Furthermore, this does not include the value of nonpecuniary job characteristics, such as working environment, length of commute from home to work, and risk of injury. As a result, we shall look at two values of average wage shares (w): 75 percent and 65 percent."
Determining a representative set of values for the average share of total wage variance due to taste differences across workers (7) is somewhat more subjective. We suspect that most labor researchers would argue that relatively little wage dispersion is due to differences in tastes. As a result, we look at the following three values for T: 10 percent, 20 percent, and 30 percent.
With regard to the degree of unobserved productivity (y), we report the effect of increasing unobserved productivity heterogeneity as it ranges from zero to 90 percent. Even so, it will be necessary to focus in on a range of values that might be expected to characterize actual labor market data. In this matter, we are guided by the fact that the R2's associated with wage equations estimated from national, cross-sectional data sets rarely rise above .50. Accordingly, we suggest that 30-50 percent of total worker productivity variance remains uncaptured by the usual set of labor market productivity variablesvariables such as age, labor market experience, and formal schooling. 10 Fringe benefits are defined as including "pay for leave time," "private pension plans," "life, accident, and health insurance," "government-required contributions to social security, workers' compensation, and unemployment insurance."
11 We have also analyzed the bias when the average wage share equals 55 percent. As can be confirmed from eq. (8), the bias is generally larger than for the two cases reported below. We omit these results in the interest of brevity. Consider now the case in which the unobserved productivity variance is between 30 and 50 percent of total productivity variancevalues we suggest conservatively represent contemporary labor market data. Not only is the compensating wage differential severely underestimated, but it can even be wrong-signed (as indicated by the fact that the value for plim[13/13] lies below the solid horizontal line).
To attach a monetary value to this result, suppose that 50 percent of total productivity heterogeneity is unobserved (let w = .65 and X = .20 as before) and that the job amenity is valued in the market for labor at $1.00 a unit. That is, jobs with an additional unit of this attribute pay workers $1.00 less per hour than they could earn elsewhere. Using micro data that contain information on workers' job choices and their personal characteristics, the econometrician would incorrectly estimate a wage premium for these jobs. According to figure 2a, this premium would amount to a little less than 5 cents an hour. Thus while the truth of the matter was that workers viewed the respective job attribute as a "good," the econometrician would incorrectly conclude from the sign of the estimated coefficient that workers judged this attribute to be a disamenity. Alternatively, if the coefficient was insignificant, he might incorrectly conclude that workers were indifferent toward this attribute.
Reviewing In fact, they may be identical. The reason for this uncertainty has to do with an approximation employed in the numerical routine used to calculate 7 for the Monte Carlo analysis. In essence, the difference in the two cases may simply be "approximation error." 14 Whatever the source of the difference, these results confirm the fact that the large biases associated with unobserved productivity heterogeneity in the linear hedonic wage case also hold when the hedonic wage function is quadratic. This raises the possibility that they may hold for other cases as well.
V. But Does It Look like a Real Data Set?
The previous two sections have demonstrated that, given either a linear or a quadratic hedonic wage constraint and worker preferences mean taste parameter, r, conditional on K, w(7|K), and substitutes this value for E(w|K). It then calculates the sample variance of w(71K) and uses this for var[E(wjK)]. In the linear case, this approximation yields bias values that are essentially identical to those calculated analytically using eq. (8). In the quadratic case, there will be a greater divergence because w is no longer a simple linear function of K (compare [1 la] with [4a] ). This approximation is adopted because the computational time associated with directly calculating var[E(wIK)] was found to be excessively large.
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that are Cobb-Douglas, the bias in estimating compensating wage differentials due to unobserved productivity heterogeneity can be related to the three factors w, T, and y. Even so, one wonders what a data set generated by this underlying framework would look like. In particular, one wonders if this structure can generate the kind of estimated wage equations that are commonly reported in studies of compensating wage differentials.
In this section we attempt to replicate the regression results reported in a seminal study of compensating wage differentials undertaken by Thaler and Rosen (1976) . We choose their study for a number of reasons. First, it attempts to estimate "the demand price for a person's own safety." Estimates of the value of saving a life are one of the most common and important policy-related applications of the theory of compensating wage differentials. Second, it estimates a linear hedonic wage function much like equation (1), even rejecting the hypothesis that the hedonic wage function is quadratic. Third, it is one of the most cited studies of its kind, in part because of the careful attention it devotes to employing only the highest-quality data about job risks.
The linear hedonic wage function estimated by Thaler and Rosen uses workers' weekly wage rate as its dependent variable. Independent variables include the human capital variables age and the square of age, as well as a formal education variable. The equation also includes one (unattractive) nonwage job attribute, risk of death. By observing the increase in wages with which a worker must be compensated to accept additional job risk, Thaler and Rosen are able to estimate how much workers would be willing to pay in order to reduce job-related deaths.
Column 1 in table 1 presents the coefficient values estimated by Thaler and Rosen.-5 These estimates suggest that an additional year of age is associated with a $3.89 increase in weekly wages, minus approximately $0.10 times the worker's age. An extra year of education is estimated to increase workers' weekly wages by $3.40. Of particular interest for our purposes is the variable RISK, which measures the probability of an extra death per year at the worker's job, multiplied by 105. The corresponding coefficient estimate is .0352. On an annualized basis, this implies that 1,000 people would together be willing to pay $176,000 to have one fewer workplace fatality within 15 Their equation also includes dummy variables for geographical region, race, occupation, full-time worker, and union status, as well as a variable measuring hours worked in previous week. The associated coefficient estimates are omitted from table 1 in the interest of brevity. Our objective is to determine whether there exist model parameters that (i) are able to generate a data set that conforms to the sample characteristics and regression results reported by Thaler and Rosen and (ii) are close to those values that we conjecture are most likely to represent actual labor market data.
For the sake of comparison, we modify the model of Section III by letting K0 = plAGE + p2(AGE)2 + p3EDUCATION, where the respective p's represent the market rates of return associated with each of the human capital variables. Accordingly, the regression equation of equation (5) 19 One objection to this analysis is that all the wage variation in our simulated samples comes from unobserved productivity and taste heterogeneity. No doubt some of the wage variation in the Thaler-Rosen study comes from non-productivity-related determinants of wages, such as regional differences, and left-hand-side measurement error. Accordingly, one could argue that the simulated samples should adjust for this by allowing smaller wage variation than reported by Thaler and Rosen. We explored this possibility and were able to replicate their regression results with model parameters that lay within the range of values identified in the text. 20 As before, the means of all the variables are identical, as are the standard deviations for AGE and EDUCATION. We emphasize that the simulated samples used in our replication analysis are observationally equivalent to the sample used by Thaler and Rosen, as measured by the means and standard deviations of the variables included in the regression equation. Further, they give rise to estimated wage equations that have exactly the same RISK coefficient that Thaler and Rosen estimate. The other coefficients and associated standard errors are also very close. Finally, both artificial data sets are characterized by (unobserved) values of average wage share, taste dispersion, and unobserved productivity heterogeneity that either fall within or are close to the range of values that we conjecture are likely to represent existing labor market data. As a result, we conclude that model parameters consistent with a severe degree of unobserved productivity bias are capable of generating observations that correspond to those employed in actual studies of compensating wage differentials.
VI. Conclusion
The empirical study of compensating wage differentials has been applied to a host of subjects. Prominent among these have been attempts to measure the implicit valuation of job-specific characteristics-such as hazardous work conditions, layoff probabilities, flexible work schedules, pensions, vacations, and other fringe benefits-and location-specific characteristics-such as climate, crime, pollution, and crowding. Particularly interesting, and perhaps most important for public-policy purposes, have been attempts to derive market valuations of a human life from estimated compensating wage differentials for the risk of fatality.
If our results are representative of what one may expect in actual labor market data, then two important implications follow. First, point estimates reported in existing studies are likely to seriously underestimate the true compensating wage differentials they are intending to measure." For example, given our optimizing framework,
